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Saggi
The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle 
pene. A question of sources and modifications*
Rosamaria Loretelli
Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”
Abstract. Unlike the first French translation, which has received adequate scholarly 
attention, the first English translation, printed in London in 1767 for the Whig book-
seller, journalist and advocate for the freedom of the press John Almon, has as yet 
been neglected by research. Following on from my previous essay, which investigated 
the editorial and political contexts, this study focuses on the translated text, enquir-
ing about its sources and faithfulness to the original. Indeed, a collation with one of 
the two Italian sixth editions (1766) and with Morellet’s version (dated 1766, but print-
ed on 28 December 1765) revealed that this text, which was the main channel for the 
dissemination of Beccaria’s ideas in the English speaking world, used both the Italian 
original and the French version as sources. In addition and most strikingly, the col-
lation also showed that the translation contains modifications of significant passages, 
which appear in neither source. They intervene surprisingly on passages whose inter-
pretation is still debated among present day scholars. The present article interprets 
changes introduced in chapter II (“Of the Right to Punish”) and in chapter XXVIII 
(“Of the Punishment of Death”). 
Keywords. Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, Eighteenth-Century Trans-
lations. 
In a letter from London of December 16, 1766, Beccaria’s friend Ales-
sandro Verri wrote to his brother Pietro telling him that the publisher Pietro 
Molini, at whose home he was staying, had recently published an Italian edi-
tion of Dei delitti e delle pene. But he added that sales had been poor and 
accordingly, many copies were sent to Paris where they sold out1.  
* I am grateful to Luigi Ferrajoli and Philippe Audegean for generously answering my queries. 
Honesty requires however that I relieve them from all responsibility for what I have done with 
their answers.
1 In the same letter, Alessandro tells his brother that Pietro Molini was brother to Giovan Claudio 
Molini who had recently published an Italian edition of Dei delitti e delle pene in Paris (P. e A. 
Verri, Viaggio a Parigi e Londra (1766-1767), a cura di G. Gaspari, Adelphi, Milano 1980, p. 148). 
The edition published by Giovan Claudio is the sixth edition, «Harlem, et se vend à Paris chez 
Molini Libraire, Quai des Augustins», 1766. Probably the edition by Pietro Molini mentioned by 
Alessandro is the other sixth edition, «Harlem, 1766», as recent research seems to believe, in spite 
of what previous scholar maintained. See R. Pasta, Tra Firenze, Napoli e l’Europa: Giuseppe Molini 
senior, in A.M. Rao (a cura di), Editoria e cultura a Napoli nel XVIII secolo, Liguori, Napoli 1998, 
pp. 251-283: 261; and L. Firpo, Le edizioni italiane del Dei delitti e delle pene, in Edizione nazio-
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Evidently, the book in the original Italian had 
almost no market in England. But when the first Eng-
lish translation appeared in London in early 1767, it 
sold very well. Another edition was published in Dub-
lin in the same year, and others in the years immedi-
ately following, in England, Scotland and America. 
This English translation was the main channel for the 
dissemination of Beccaria’s thinking in the English-
speaking world.
A few readers accessed Dei delitti e delle pene in 
Italian, of course, such as Thomas Jefferson and John 
Adams, who drew inspiration from Beccaria when they 
wrote the Declaration of Independence, having discussed 
the Italian text of the book with Filippo Mazzei2. Prob-
ably Benjamin Franklin also read Dei delitti in Italian3; 
and Jeremy Bentham possessed the English edition, 
as well as a copy in Italian and one in French4. George 
Washington5, however, and most jurists6, judges7, jour-
nalists, novelists and the English reading public in gen-
eral accessed Beccaria’s ideas through the English trans-
lation.
To the best of my knowledge, nothing has so far 
been written on the text of this translation or on its 
sources and fidelity to the original. The aim of the pre-
sent article is to fill this gap. This will provide a better 
understanding of the function assigned to Dei delitti e 
delle pene by the people and the milieu who prompted 
its translation8, as well as of the modes of its reception 
nale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria [hereafter EN], vol. I. Dei delitti e del-
le pene, a cura di G. Francioni, Mediobanca, Milano 1984, pp. 466-473.
2 E. Tortarolo, Illuminismo e rivoluzioni. Biografia politica di Filippo 
Mazzei, Franco Angeli, Milano 1986, pp. 42-43. For Mazzei’s letters 
to Jefferson and Adams, see Filippo Mazzei: scelta di scritti e lettere, a 
cura di M. Marchione, Edizioni del Palazzo, Prato 1984, vol. I, p. 9. J.D. 
Bessler gives valuable information about the American readers of On 
Crimes and Punishments throughout his The Birth of American Law. An 
Italian Philosopher and the American Revolution, Carolina Academic Pr., 
Durham 2014. For the libraries of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams 
which contained copies of Italian editions, see p. 186. 
3 M. Maestro, Benjamin Franklin and the Penal Law, «Journal of the His-
tory of Ideas», 36, 1975, pp. 551-562: 554.
4 I would like to thank Philip Schofield for this piece of information.
5 George Washington read Beccaria in the English translation (Bessler, 
The Birth of American Law, cit. p. 186). Others probably read André 
Morellet’s French translation, which was also reprinted in America.
6 In a persuasive article, which assesses the early impact of Beccaria’s 
On Crimes and Punishments on English discussions on punishment, 
focusing mainly on William Blackstone, William Eden and Jeremy Ben-
tham, Anthony Draper maintains that Beccaria’s influence was partic-
ularly striking in England and had profound consequences for English 
approaches to punishment. A.J. Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s influence on 
early discussions of punishment, 1764-1789, «History of European Ideas», 
26, 2000, pp. 177-199.
7 J. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England. 1660-1800, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1986, pp. 223, 555-556, 558, 628-629, 632.
8 For external evidence about the milieu which promoted this transla-
tion, see R. Loretelli, The First English Translation of Cesare Beccaria’s 
in Britain9 and of the very presence of Beccaria’s ideas in 
the English speaking world.
The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle 
pene was published in February 1767. The year of pub-
lication is printed on the title-page, and the month can 
be established by merging information gleaned from 
the letters exchanged between Alessandro Verri and 
his brother Pietro with the entries in the April issues of 
«The Scots Magazine» and «The Critical Review». 
In a letter dated 15 January 1767, Alessandro wrote 
that Beccaria’s book was being translated into English 
and that it would shortly be published; on 8 February, 
Pietro replied that he had informed Beccaria, and on 
26 February he asked for a copy of the book with the 
reviews it had received in Britain10. The reviews were 
enthusiastic. «The Critical Review» referred to the text 
as «one of the most original books which the present 
age hath produced», and «The Annual Register» pub-
lished many extracts in a long piece by Edmund Burke, 
who was an MP at the time and already famous for his 
Enquiry into the Sublime and the Beautiful11. 
But a question needs to be asked: what was the exact 
text which they were reviewing? Was it faithful to Bec-
caria’s original or was it based on the French version, the 
language of eighteenth-century cultural mediation? And 
again, if it changed the original, was it to render it pal-
atable to the English public, or to enhance some other 
project? Our collation has answered these questions with 
evidence which we will illustrate and try to interpret in 
the following pages.
On Crimes and Punishments. Uncovering the Editorial and Political 
Contexts, «Diciottesimo secolo», 3, 2017, pp. 1-22.
9 For its dissemination in America, see Bessler, The Birth of Ameri-
can Law, cit., and, by the same, The Celebrated Marquis. An Italian 
Noble and the Making of the Modern World, Carolina Academic Press, 
Durham 2018, ch. V and VI.
10 P. e A. Verri, Viaggio a Parigi e Londra, a cura di G. Gaspari, Adelphi, 
Milano 1980, pp. 24, 259, and 320.
11 «The Critical Review», 23, April 23rd 1767 (p. 257); «A Catalogue of 
New Books» of the April issue of «The Scots Magazine», p. 210. The 
book is listed neither in the February issue (which excludes January as 
the month of publication) nor in that of March. However, the column 
for the new books in the March issue is completely occupied by a sum-
mary of Adam Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society, and 
ends by informing readers that «The rest of the books are deferred». If 
we align this piece of information with Pietro Verri’s request at the end 
of February, we can deduce that the translation was published in Feb-
ruary. Edmund Burke was one of the founders of the «Annual Regis-
ter», to which he contributed with reviews on law and politics. P.J. Stan-
lis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law, Transaction Publishers, New 
Brunswick (nj) 2009 (1958), p. 37.
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SOURCES. 
In the 1958 introduction to Dei delitti12, Franco Ven-
turi drew attention to the first English translation, men-
tioning the unknown translator’s critique of the French 
version and implicitly endorsing the idea that the Eng-
lish rendering was faithful to the original. A few years 
later, however, at a conference organized by him and 
Luigi Firpo for the 200th anniversary of the first Ital-
ian edition, Leo Radzinowicz mentioned an unspeci-
fied «French edition» as the source for the first English 
translation. At the same conference, H.L.A Hart under-
wrote Radzinowicz’s information and explicitly named 
the Enlightenment philosophe André Morellet as the 
author of the French translation13. The relation of the 
English with the French translation was stated again 
more recently by Frederick Rosen in one of the intro-
ductions to a volume of The Collected Works of Jeremy 
Bentham.14 Whereas, in 2008, Aaron Thomas took a 
more cautious stance, mentioning the passage of the 
translator’s preface in which he criticizes Morellet’s 
reshuffling of Beccaria’s chapters and pointing out that 
«even this translator (i.e., the English translator) admit-
ted to permitting “a paragraph or two” to stand where 
Morellet left them». Thomas concluded that «Fidelity to 
Beccaria’s original text could not therefore be automati-
cally assumed».15 
The question remained unanswered. Which of the 
scholars was right? Which is the true source for the Eng-
lish translation? The answer could emerge only from 
a collation with Morellet’s Traité des délits et des pei-
12 Venturi’s edition was based on the fifth Italian edition (March 1766), 
the last, as he was the first to ascertain, for which there is explicit evi-
dence of authorial revision. See F. Venturi, Introduzione a Dei delitti e 
delle pene, in La letteratura italiana. Storie e testi, vol. 46/III. Illuministi 
italiani. Riformatori lombardi, piemontesi e toscani, a cura di F. Venturi, 
Ricciardi, Milano 1958 pp. 4-13. For the history of this edition, see G. 
Francioni, La “quinta” edizione e le testimonianze autografe, and L. Fir-
po, La “quinta” edizione (Livorno, marzo 1766), in EN, vol. I, cit., respec-
tively, pp. 292-304 and 444-466. 
13 L. Radzinowicz, Cesare Beccaria and the English System of Criminal 
Justice. A Reciprocal Relationship, and H.L.A. Hart, Beccaria and Ben-
tham, in Atti del convegno internazionale su Cesare Beccaria promosso 
dall’Accademia delle scienze di Torino nel secondo centenario dell’opera 
“Dei delitti e delle pene” (4-6 ott. 1964), Accademia delle scienze, Torino 
1966 («Memoria dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di Scien-
ze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche», s. IV, nr. 9), respectively, pp. 57-66, 
and pp. 21-29.
14 The other introduction was by H.L.A. Hart. The Collected Works of 
Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Leg-
islation, ed. by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1996 (reprinted in 2005), note 106, p. lxvi.
15 Aaron Thomas, Preface (p. xxx), in C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Pun-
ishments and other writings, ed. by A. Thomas, transl. by A. Thomas 
and J. Parzen, Introduction by A. Burgio, University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto-Buffalo-London 2008.
nes and the Italian original at the same time. We have 
therefore proceeded to collate the three texts, choosing 
the first editions of the English and the French16 transla-
tions, and one of the two Italian sixth editions17.
The title-page of the English translation reads: An 
Essay on Crimes and Punishments, translated from the 
Italian; with a Commentary attributed to Monsieur de 
Voltaire; translated from the French. There follows the 
quotation from Francis Bacon and, at the foot of the 
page, the name of the publisher: «London: Printed for 
J. Almon, opposite Burlington-House, Piccadilly, MDC-
CLXVII». Pages III to VIII carry the translator’s pref-
ace, and pages IX to XII, a table of contents for both the 
Essay and Voltaire’s Commentary. 
It should be noted that the French and the Eng-
lish translations modify Beccaria’s title, but not both in 
the same way. Morellet’s systematic reordering of the 
original text is anticipated by the term Traité18 in his 
title. Whereas, more in tune with Beccaria’s title, Essay 
sounds less assertive, reflecting a philosophical tradition 
which goes from Montaigne and Bacon to Locke and 
Hume. Moreover, the publisher John Almon was a nota-
ble figure in the Opposition, a journalist, an advocate 
for the freedom of the press and a friend of Lord Temple 
and John Wilkes19. 
The first pages of the English publication do not 
contain some of the texts present in the fifth and in the 
two sixth Italian editions. Those titled «A chi legge» 
[To the reader] and «Avviso» [Notice] are missing; also 
missing are De Soria’s Guidizio di celebre professore and 
Risposta to Facchinei.20 Indeed, if the Italian fifth and 
sixth editions number more than three hundred pages, 
the English translation has only 179 pages of the Essay 
16 Traité des délits et des peines, traduit de l’Italien, D’après la troisième 
Edition, révue, corrigée, et augmentée par l’Auteur. Avec des Additions 
de l’Auteur, qui n’ont pas encore paru en Italien. Lausanne [Paris] 1766.
17 Dei delitti e delle pene, edizione sesta, di nuovo corretta ed accresciuta, 
Harlem 1766. This edition probably appeared in the Autumn of 1766, 
while the other sixth edition (Harlem, et se vend à Paris chez Molini 
Libraire, Quai des Augustins) was published in the August of 1766 by 
Giovan Claudio Molini brother to that Pietro Molini who hosted Ales-
sandro Verri in London (see note 1 in the present article). When the 
English translation was published, therefore, three Italian editions with 
the same text were in print, the fifth and the two sixth editions.
18 For the philosophical implications of the linguistic choices of Traité 
and of Essay, see J. Pandolfi, Morellet traducteur de Beccaria, in A. Luzi 
(a cura di), Il genio delle lingue. Le traduzioni nel ’700 in area franco-
italiana, Treccani, Roma 1989, pp. 291-316: 296.
19 D.D. Rogers, Bookseller as Rogue: John Almon and the Politics of Eigh-
teenth-Century Publishing, Peter Lang, New York-Bern-Frankfurt 1986. 
For their connection with the translation of Dei delitti e delle pene, see 
my The First English Translation, cit., pp. 8-18.
20 Avviso, which introduces the fifth Italian edition, does not appear in 
some impressions; Giudizio, and Risposta (written by Pietro Verri, with 
Alessandro’s help) do not appear in Morellet. For the reasons, see Fran-
cioni Nota al testo, in EN, cit., vol. I, pp. 301-302. 
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on Crimes and Punishments, plus 79 pages of Voltaire’s 
Commentary.
A word needs to be said about the presence of Vol-
taire’s text. It is important to note that this was the very 
first edition of Voltaire’s Commentary in a foreign lan-
guage. The book had been published anonymously in 
France in early September 1766 and, by February 1767, 
it had run through six editions, plus a few pirated ones. 
An Italian version would appear as a separate volume a 
few months after the English translation, but it was only 
in 1769 that it would be issued in one volume with Bec-
caria’s Dei delitti e delle pene21.
When the English translation appeared, André 
Morellet’s very successful French version had already 
been in print for more than a year22, since it had been 
published before the Italian fifth edition, although Bec-
caria had informed the philosophe of what he would lat-
er insert into that edition.23 In his preface, the English 
translator admits that he knows Morellet’s text, but criti-
cizes his modifications («he hath not only transposed 
every chapter, but every paragraph in the whole book»), 
stating that he himself had opted for preserving «the 
original order». However, he adds, «in a passage or two» 
he «had taken the liberty to restore [passages] to the 
chapters to which they evidently belong and from which 
they must have been accidentally detached»24. Morel-
let had used the same justification for his own reshuf-
fling of the original chapters, saying that he had restored 
«l’ordre le plus naturel», «par quelques simples transpo-
sitions de Chapitres ou de parties de Chapitres»25. 
However, despite his critique of Morellet, we do not 
need to go far in order to find evidence of the transla-
tor’s knowing the French version very well and of using 
it, although not slavishly. More: no effort is required 
to find examples of the fact that he turned sometimes 
to Morellet and at other times to the Italian original; 
indeed, every page shows that the author of the transla-
tion had both the Italian text and Morellet on his desk. 
21 For the publishing history of the Commentaire, see Firpo, Le edizioni 
italiane del Dei delitti e delle pene, in EN, cit., vol. I, pp. 487-495.
22 Published on December 28, 1765, although dated 1766. G. Francioni, 
Nota al testo, in EN, cit., vol. I, p. 292.
23 Morellet’s version was based on the third edition. After the publica-
tion of a pirated Italian fourth edition, Beccaria’s publisher Coltellini 
called fifth edition the one he was preparing. On this, see Francioni, 
Nota al testo, in EN, cit., vol. I, pp. 304-315. See also Pandolfi, Morellet 
traducteur de Beccaria, cit.; and S. Bersezio, La traduzione francese del 
Dei delitti e delle pene di André Morellet, in Il caso Beccaria, Il Mulino, 
Bologna 2016, pp. 111-137. For other French translations, see P. Aude-
gean, L’ombre de Morellet. Les premières traductions françaises de Becca-
ria (1765-1822), in Cesare Beccaria. La controverse pénale XVIIIe-XXIe 
siècle, éd. par M. Porret et É. Salvi, P.U.R., Rennes 2015, pp. 119-132.
24 An Essay on crimes and Punishments, London 1767, p. v.
25 Ibidem, p. viii. 
The very first paragraph of Beccaria’s Introduzione 
runs:
Gli uomini lasciano per lo più in abbandono i più impor-
tanti regolamenti alla giornaliera prudenza, o alla discre-
zione di quelli, l’ interesse dei quali è di opporsi alle più 
provvide Leggi, che per natura rendono universali i vantag-
gi, e resistono a quello sforzo, per cui tendono a condensar-
si in pochi, riponendo da una parte il colmo della potenza 
e della felicità, e dall’altra tutta la debolezza e la miseria. 
Perciò se non dopo essere passati frammezzo mille errori 
nelle cose più essenziali alla vita e alla libertà, dopo una 
stanchezza di soffrire i mali, giunti all’estremo, non s’indu-
cono a rimediare ai disordini che gli opprimono...26
This is Morellet:
Parmi les hommes réunis, il s’exerce un effort continuel qui 
tend à placer dans une partie de la société toute la puis-
sance et tout le bonheur, et dans l’autre toute la misère et 
toute la faiblesse. L’effet des bonnes lois est de s’opposer 
sans cesse à cet effort. Mais les hommes abandonnent ordi-
nairement le soin de régler les choses les plus importantes 
à la prudence du moment ou à la discrétion de ceux-là 
mêmes qui sont intéressés à rejeter les meilleures institu-
tions. Aussi n’est-ce qu’aux dernières extrémités, et lassés 
de souffrir, qu’ils se déterminent à remédier aux maux 
dont ils sont accablés. Ce n’est qu’après avoir passé par 
mille erreurs funestes à leur vie et à leur liberté27. 
This is the English translator’s rendering:
[“In every human society, there is an effort continually 
tending to confer on one part the height of power and hap-
piness, and to reduce the other to the extreme of weak-
ness and misery. The intent of good laws is to oppose this 
effect,/A] [and to diffuse their influence, universally, and 
equally./B] [But men generally abandon the care of their 
most important concerns to the uncertain prudence, and 
direction of those, whose interest it is to reject the best, and 
wisest institutions;/C] [and it is not till they have been led 
into a thousand mistakes in matters, the most essential to 
their lives and liberties, and are weary of suffering, that 
they can be induced.../D]28.
26 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., pp. 9-10. 
27 I have modernised the spelling, since this aspect of Morellet’s text is 
not the focus of the present article.
28 What is marked with an A at the end comes from Morellet. What is 
marked with a B is not in Morellet, but freely translates a sentence which 
in the Italian original comes slightly later («rendono universali i vantag-
gi e resistono a quello sforzo per cui tendono a condensarsi in pochi»). 
C contains the incipit of the Italian text. Here, Morellet translates «leggi» 
with «institutions», and the English translator with «institutions», evident-
ly imitating the French solution. D: this part and beyond follow the lesson 
of the Italian original. In the English translation, the Introduction ends at 
the ending of the Italian original, while the French translation inserted at 
this point passages which in the original are in chapters VIII and IX.
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This method is used throughout the translation, 
showing that its author felt free to choose either one 
or other of the sources within the same paragraph and 
sometimes even within the same sentence. This passage 
from the beginning of the Introduzione is only the first 
of a great number of such instances, but we shall avoid 
pointless repetition. 
I would like, however, to draw attention to three 
further examples: clauses which, as Gianni Francioni 
has highlighted, appear in the Italian original but not 
in the French version. Surprisingly enough, in two cas-
es the English translation follows Morellet, but in the 
third it opts for Beccaria’s original29. The two passages 
which appear neither in the French nor in the English 
translation are: «Le fissazioni dei limiti sono così nec-
essarie nella politica, come nella matematica, tanto 
nella misura del bene pubblico, quanto nella misura 
delle grandezze»30 and: «Questa è la cagione, per cui le 
offese ne fanno nascere delle nuove, che l’odio è un sen-
timento, tanto più durevole dell’amore, quanto il primo 
prende la sua forza dalla continuazione degli atti, che 
indebolisce il secondo»31. In the Italian original, they 
are in chapters XXXIV («Dei debitori»/«Of Bankrupts») 
and XL («False idee di utilità»/«Of false Ideas of Util-
ity»), respectively. 
In the third case, however, the passage which is 
missing in Morellet, is present in the English version, 
proving once more that the translator accessed Bec-
caria’s book in both languages, choosing from time to 
time which text to use. In the Italian original of chap-
ter XXXIII («Contrabbandi»/«Of Smuggling») we read: 
«Chiunque dà pene infamanti a delitti, che non sono 
reputati tali dagli uomini, scema il sentimento d’infamia 
per quelli, che lo sono”32. In Morellet the passage does 
not appear, while in the English version we find: «By 
inflicting infamous punishments, for crimes that are not 
reputed so, we destroy that idea where it may be useful». 
If the English text does not follow Morellet here, a few 
paragraphs later, however, it is again dependent on his 
version, thus proceeding with ad hoc choices until the 
last page of the book. 
These few instances from among the many we have 
come across in the course of our collation point to the 
conclusion that, although the English translator did not 
accept Morellet’s ordering of the chapters, neither did he 
move many paragraphs (more, however, than the «one 
or two» he declared in the preface), he sometimes fol-
29 Francioni explains the reasons why Morellet omitted the three passag-
es in in Nota al testo, in EN, cit., vol. I, p. 309. 
30 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., p. 167. 
31 Ibidem, p. 187.
32 Ibidem, p. 160.
lowed the French translation. And, at other times how-
ever, he reverted to the Italian original. 
Thus, the question of the sources of the English ver-
sion of Dei delitti e delle pene leads to an incontrovert-
ible solution: the translator had the two texts in front 
of him and chose either one or the other to translate 
from, according to a criterion which seems to be purely 
his own. What was this criterion? More: were Beccaria’s 
original and Morellet’s version the English translator’s 
only options, or had he other strings to his bow? The 
collation also revealed information on these points. 
MODIFICATIONS AS INTERPRETATION. CHAPTER II: 
“OF THE RIGHT TO PUNISH”. 
The most apparent criterion behind the transla-
tor’s choices is a search for clarity. He tends to accept 
Morellet’s version where it disambiguates the Italian, 
sometimes just to render it easily readable, sometimes 
with more fundamental purposes in mind. His inten-
tion, however, does not seem to be to simplify the con-
tent; but rather, to avoid the risk of misunderstandings. 
The translation aims at expressing ideas as clearly and as 
completely as possible, resolving the ambiguities of cer-
tain passages. This practice pervades the whole transla-
tion, leading its author at times to use Morellet, at other 
times to revert to the Italian original, and sometimes 
even to make changes of his own.
But there is more to be said: disambiguating a text 
involves interpretation, a choice between possible mean-
ings, the reductio ad unum of polysemic ambiguity. Even 
when it is the outcome of superficial haste, resulting in 
unsatisfactory understanding, disambiguation implies 
a hermeneutic move. The more so in the case of this 
translation, which is linguistically accurate, incisive and 
very careful not to blur meanings. Therefore, all changes 
made here to the Italian original cannot be dismissed as 
irrelevant; rather, they should be viewed as a philosophi-
cal (and perhaps political) stance taken by whoever was 
involved in the translation.
In actual fact, our collation has brought to light 
changes which all reside within a single coherent per-
spective, a perspective which we shall attempt to illus-
trate in the following pages. We shall draw attention 
to modifications, present in two relevant and complex 
passages, which point to foundational aspects of Becca-
ria’s thinking. In these cases, the translation shows clear 
signs of interpretation. One change occurs in chapter 
II («Diritto di punire»/«Of the Right to punish»), and 
another in chapter XXVIII («Della pena di morte»/«On 
the Punishment of Death»).
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In chapter II Beccaria famously states that by virtue 
of the social contract citizens yielded the «smallest por-
tion possible» («minima porzione possibile») of their lib-
erty, «as much only as was sufficient to engage others to 
defend it»33. With a formulation which has since become 
standard, Luigi Ferrajoli called this parsimony principle 
«diritto penale minimo» (minimum penal law). 34 Fur-
ther on in this chapter, Beccaria writes: 
L’aggregato di queste minime porzioni possibili forma il 
diritto di punire, tutto il di più è abuso e non giustizia; è 
Fatto, ma non già Diritto. Osservate, che la parola Dirit-
to non è contraddittoria alla parola Forza; ma la prima è 
piuttosto una modificazione della seconda, cioè la modi-
ficazione più utile al maggior numero. E per giustizia io 
non intendo altro che il vincolo necessario per tenere uni-
ti gl’ interessi particolari, che senz’esso si scioglierebbero 
nell’antico stato di insociabilità: tutte le pene, che oltrepas-
sano la necessità di conservare questo vincolo sono ingiuste 
di lor natura. Bisogna guardarsi di non attaccare a questa 
parola Giustizia l’ idea di qualche cosa di reale, come di 
una forza fisica o di un Essere esistente35.
This is how the 1767 English translation renders the 
passage:
The aggregate of these, the smallest portions possible, 
forms the right of punishing: all that extends beyond this is 
abuse, not justice.
Observe, that by justice I understand nothing more, than 
that bond, which is necessary to keep the interest of indi-
viduals united; without which, men would return to their 
original state of barbarity: All punishments, which exceed 
the necessity of preserving this bond, are in their nature 
unjust. We should be cautious how we associate with the 
word justice, an idea of any thing real, such as a physical 
power, or a being that actually exists36. 
The modification present in the English version is 
anything but banal and insignificant. It consists in the 
omission of the following sentences, which I quote from 
the modern translation by Aaron Thomas and Jeremy 
Parzen: «it is a matter of fact, not of right. Note that the 
word right is not in contradiction with the word force; 
rather, the former is a modification of the latter, that is, 
the modification most useful to the greatest number»37. 
33 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 9.
34 L. Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale, Laterza, 
Roma-Bari 2011 (1989), pp. 197, 325-339.
35 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., pp. 17-18. Italics in the Ital-
ian original. For an interpretation of this passage, see Ph. Audegean, 
Cesare Beccaria, filosofo europeo Carocci, Roma 2014 (2010), pp. 113 ff.
36An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 9. 
37 I am going to use the 1767 translation for all passages where it faith-
fully follows Beccaria’s original. Wherever it does not, or where passag-
es are omitted, I am using Aaron Thomas’s modern translation. For this 
At first sight, this omission may appear as the result of 
no more than a search for clarity and simplicity, which 
is one of the things it achieves. At the same time, how-
ever, it is a precise act of interpretation. If we view this 
omission against the background of Beccaria’s ideas con-
cerning the relation between force and law, the herme-
neutic move and the interpretative option behind this 
change become evident.
Departing from the preceeding tradition where jus 
and potestas, i.e, law and force were never presented as 
opposed to each other, Beccaria, highly innovative also 
on this point, separates them. In a fundamental article 
which sheds light on this aspect of Beccaria’s thinking, 
Gianni Francioni draws attention to several passages of 
Dei delitti e delle pene in which «forza» (force) is repeat-
edly opposed to «diritto» (law, legitimated by the social 
contract)38. Force is opposed to law and justice, for 
example, in chapter XVI («Of Torture»), where the Mil-
anese philosopher writes: «Quale è dunque quel diritto, 
se non quello della forza, che dia la podestà ad un Giu-
dice di dare una pena ad un Cittadino, mentre si dubita 
se sia reo o innocente?»39; and in chapter XXIX («Della 
cattura»), where we find: 
Ma per qual ragione è così diverso ai tempi nostri l’esito 
di un innocente? Perché sembra, che nel presente sistema 
criminale, secondo l’opinione degli uomini, prevalga l’ i-
dea della forza e della prepotenza, a quella della giustizia; 
perché si gettano confusi nella stessa caverna gli accusati e 
i convinti; perché la prigione è piuttosto un supplicio, che 
una custodia del reo, e perché la forza interna tutrice delle 
leggi è separata dalla esterna difenditrice del Trono e della 
Nazione, quando unite dovrebbon essere40. 
In Beccaria’s thinking law and force are doubtlessly 
separated, as Francioni concludes after having exposed 
passage, see C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writ-
ings, ed. Thomas, cit., p. 12.
38 G. Francioni, “Ius” e “potestas”. Beccaria e la pena di morte, «Révue 
d’historie du droit de punir», II, 2016 (monographic issue on Cesare 
Beccaria), pp. 13-49.
39 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., p. 69. «What right, then, 
but that of power, can authorize the punishment of a citizen, so long as 
there remains any doubt of his guilt?» (An Essay on Crimes and Punish-
ments, cit., p. 57). It is worth checking this passage in Morellet: «Quel 
autre droit que celui de la force peut autoriser un Juge à infliger une 
peine à un citoyen, lorsq’on doute encore s’il est innocent ou coupable?».
40 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., p. 136. «But why is the fate 
of an innocent person so different in this age? It is, because the present 
system of penal laws presents to our minds an idea of power rather 
than of justice. It is, because the accused and convicted are thrown 
indiscriminately into the same prison of the accused; and because the 
interior power, which defends the laws, and the exterior, which defends 
the throne and kingdom are separate, when they should be united» (An 
Essay on Crimes and Punishment, cit., p. 119).
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more of such evidence41. 
If we now revert to the passage quoted above from 
chapter II and examine it in light of what has just been 
said, we can – credibly, I believe – hypothesize the rea-
son why the English translator might have decided to 
modify it. It is that the part he omitted carries an ambi-
guity precisely in the area of the relation between force 
and law. The sentence «la parola diritto non è contrad-
dittoria alla parola forza, ma la prima è piuttosto una 
modificazione della seconda, cioè la modificazione più 
utile al maggior numero» is ambiguous. It could mean 
that force guarantees the compliance with the law42; but 
it could also signify that there is a connection between 
force and the origin of law, legitimising law by recourse 
to the concept of the utility of the greatest number. An 
option which would be in contradiction with the oth-
er occurrences where law and force are radically and 
unambiguously separated. By eliminating this passage, 
the English version avoided all risks of such contradic-
tion, thus bringing the paragraph into harmony with 
one of the ideas which are right at the heart of Beccaria’s 
project.
Before concluding on this passage, mention must 
be made of the fact that the omission to which we drew 
attention is not to be found in Morellet, whose transla-
tion in this case is faithful to the original. The omission 
is the English translator’s initiative and reveals, it would 
seem, his philosophical awareness and deep understand-
ing of Beccaria’s work.
MODIFICATIONS AS INTERPRETATION. CHAPTER 
XXVIII: “OF THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH”. 
If we now turn to chapter XXVIII, «Della pena di 
morte» (Of the Punishment of Death), we also discover 
consistent changes. This time, however, most of them are 
also in Morellet. Most, but not all: another proof of the 
fact that the English translator’s interpretative strategy 
did not stem from slavish fidelity to Morellet, but from a 
project of his own.
This chapter, which is the longest in the book, 
begins with a paragraph which discusses whether or not 
the death penalty is founded on a right to punish deriv-
ing from the social contract. The conclusion reached is 
41 Francioni, “Ius” e “potestas”, cit., p. 31, note 44.
42 In the National Edition, Francioni interprets this passage in light of 
the many others which, in Dei delitti, unambiguously separate force 
from law: «L’affermazione può essere fraintesa, se non collegata ad altri 
passi del Dei delitti, che mostrano come per Beccaria forza e diritto non 
si identifichino [...]. La forza dunque non origina né legittima il diritto 
ma ne garantisce l’osservanza ai fini dell’utilità, se non di tutti, del “mag-
gior numero”» (EN, p. 32, note 1).
that it has no such foundation. The second and third 
paragraphs continue: 
Non è dunque la pena di morte un Diritto, mentre ho 
dimostrato che tale, essere non può; ma è una guerra del-
la Nazione con un Cittadino, perché giudica necessaria, o 
utile la distruzione del suo Essere: Ma se dimostrerò non 
essere la morte né utile, né necessaria, avrò vinto la causa 
dell’umanità.
La morte di un Cittadino non può credersi necessaria, che 
per due motivi. Il primo, quando anche privo di libertà 
egli abbia ancora tali relazioni, e tal potenza, che interessi 
la sicurezza della Nazione; quando la sua esistenza possa 
produrre una rivoluzione pericolosa nella forma di gover-
no stabilita. La morte di qualche Cittadino divien dunque 
necessaria quando la Nazione ricupera, o perde la sua 
libertà, o nel tempo dell’Anarchia, quando i disordini stessi 
tengon luogo di leggi; ma durante il tranquillo regno del-
le leggi in una forma di governo, per la quale i voti della 
Nazione siano riuniti, ben munita al di fuori, e al di den-
tro dalla forza, e dall’opinione forse più efficace della forza 
medesima, dove il comando non è che presso il vero Sovra-
no, dove le ricchezze comprano piaceri, e non autorità, io 
non veggo necessità alcuna di distruggere un Cittadino, se 
non quando la di lui morte fosse il vero e unico freno per 
distogliere gli altri dal commettere delitti, secondo motivo, 
per cui può credersi giusta, e necessaria la pena di morte43. 
Rounding off the argument developed in the first 
paragraph, the second paragraph (the first of the two 
quoted above) repeats conclusively that no right author-
izes the death penalty. Under the social contract, the 
death penalty is always illegitimate. It is a war moved 
by a nation against one of its citizens, whose destruction 
the nation deems either necessary or useful. The para-
graph closes with a sentence which states the aim of the 
rest of the chapter, which is to prove that the death pen-
alty is in fact neither necessary nor useful. 
The third paragraph assigns centre stage to necessity. 
Only in two cases («due motivi»), says the Italian original, 
the death of a citizen may be considered necessary. The 
first case is when a citizen «retains such connections and 
such power that he endangers the security of the nation 
even when deprived of his liberty, that is, when his very 
existence can provoke a dangerous revolution in the 
established form of government. The death of such a citi-
zen, then, becomes necessary when a nation is recovering 
or losing its liberty; or in time of anarchy, when disorder 
itself takes the place of laws», but not during the normal 
functioning of a State («regno tranquillo della legislazi-
one»). This is the modern faithful translation of the para-
graph44. As we shall see, the 1767 version is different.
43 Dei delitti e delle pene VI, Harlem 1766, cit., pp. 118-120. 
44 Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, cit., p. 52. 
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The hermeneutic difficulty provided by this ‘first 
case’ can be summarized by the following question: 
does it describe a situation in which the social contract, 
although at risk, may be considered still existing; or is 
the situation one of such anarchy that the social contract 
is no longer binding, since individuals have reverted to 
the state of nature? The point at issue is a possible excep-
tion under the rule of law to Beccaria’s rejection of the 
death penalty. Opinions diverge amongst present-day 
scholars. According to some, here Beccaria is making 
a distinction between a ‘normal’ and an ‘exceptional’ 
state of things, both of them within the social con-
tract. Although with arguments differently nuanced, 
these scholars maintain that, according to Beccaria, an 
exceptional state of things would impose a suspension of 
the rules, and in such a case the Milanese philosopher 
would not be against the death penalty45. Of a different 
opinion is Gianni Francioni, who upholds that within 
the social contract Beccaria conceives of no exceptions 
to a total abolition of the death penalty. The situation 
contemplated here is, in Francioni’s opinion, of «a revo-
lutionary disruption of the social contract, of a dissolu-
tion of society which has moved individuals back into 
the ‘state of war’». Therefore, it would not be a situation 
bordering to a reversion to bellum omnium, but a real 
bellum omnium. In sum, according to Francioni, Becca-
ria admits of no intermediate positions between the state 
of nature and the rule of law. The social contract can-
not be “suspended”; it is either in existence and binding, 
or it does not exist any longer, and society has reverted 
to the state of nature. For Beccaria, therefore, the death 
penalty is always illegitimate46.
45 Audegean, Cesare Beccaria, filosofo europeo, chapter «Giustizia e uti-
lità», in particular p. 123; C. Beccaria, Des délits et des peines. Suivi de 
Avis au sujet de la peine de mort, Préface, traduction et notes de Ph. 
Audegean, Note de L. Ferrajoli, Payot et Rivage, Paris, 2014, note on 
pp. 130-121; D. Ippolito, Contratto sociale e pena capitale: Beccaria vs 
Rousseau, «Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto», 4, 2014, pp. 
607 ff.; N. Campagna, Sonnenfels, Beccaria et la peine de mort, in Ph. 
Audegean and L. Delia (eds.), Le moment Beccaria. Naissance du droit 
pénal (1764-1810), Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2018 («Oxford 
University Studies in the Enlightenment»), pp. 195 and 203-204. Fran-
cioni mentions K. Ladd, Penser la peine dans la souveraineté et dans 
l’époque: Situation de l’argumentation abolitionniste dans Des délits et des 
peines de Cesare Beccaria, in L. Delia et G. Radica (eds.), Penser la peine 
à l’âge des Lumières, «Lumières», 20, 2012, pp. 101-120: 108 ff.; and P. 
Costa, Lo ius vitae ac necis alla prova: Cesare Beccaria e la tradizione 
contrattualistica, «Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridi-
co moderno»,. 44, 2015, 2, pp. 817-895. 
46 G. Francioni, Beccaria filosofo utilitarista, in Cesare Beccaria fra 
Milano e l’Europa, Atti del convegno di studi per il 250° anniversa-
rio della nascita promosso dal Comune di Milano, Cariplo-Laterza, 
Milano-Roma-Bari, 1990, pp. 69-87 (A slightly modified French tran-
slation appeared under the title of Beccaria, philosophe utilitariste, in Le 
bonheur du plus grand nombre. Beccaria et les Lumières, sous la direc-
tion de Ph. Audegean, et al., ENS Éditions, Lyon 2017). See also Fran-
I have briefly summarized the two current most 
relevant lines of interpretation, not in order to enter a 
debate which lies outside both the aim of this article and 
my field of competence, but to indicate the hermeneutic 
difficulty of this passage and the questions at stake. This, 
in order to highlight the fact that the verbal formulation 
of this passage contains an ambiguity which, as we shall 
see, the English translator seemed to be aware of. As 
he also seemed to be aware of the philosophical impli-
cations of this ambiguity. Interestingly, he introduced 
changes which framed a text unambiguously consonant 
with one of the two interpretative options exposed above 
– most precisely with Francioni’s. 
So much for the moment about the first case («pri-
mo motivo»). The second case («secondo motivo») – also 
mentioned in the third paragraph of the Italian original 
– hypothesizes a justification of the death penalty in a 
situation in which the State is functioning normally and 
the social contract is binding. This case refers to a pos-
sible deterrent role of the death penalty. The question 
Beccaria implicitly asks here is: would the death penalty 
be justified if it served to dissuade citizens from com-
mitting crimes? And the answer, to which the rest of 
the chapter is devoted, is an unwavering no. On histori-
cal and psychological grounds, Beccaria proves that the 
death penalty has no deterrent capacity. 
This conclusion is crystal clear. However, the sen-
tence «secondo motivo, per cui può credersi giusta, e 
necessaria la pena di morte» contains a term which 
looks problematic. The use of the word «giusta» (applied 
to the two cases) risks destroying retrospectively the 
clarity of the argument developed in the first paragraph 
of the chapter, as it seems to imply that if proved nec-
essary, the death penalty becomes «giusta», i.e., rightful, 
legitimate. But the first paragraph had stated that the 
death penalty is never «giusta», never founded on a right 
to punish deriving from the social contract, and is there-
fore always illegitimate. Does Beccaria use that word 
inadvertently, or is it a deliberate choice? Is it a «termi-
nological imprecision»47, or a precise option? What is 
certain is that the presence in this sentence of the word 
«giusta» – legitimate – blurs the interpretation and ush-
ers in controversial questions. 
To sum up: as framed in the original Italian text, the 
first of the two cases – the two «motivi», possible excep-
tions to a total abolition of the death penalty – presents 
an ambiguity which requires strong hermeneutic moves. 
As to the sentence mentioning the second case, although 
it provides a hypothesis which will be unambiguously 
rejected in the rest of the chapter, it nonetheless hosts 
cionj, «Ius» e «potestas», cit., p. 43.
47 Francioni, «Ius» e «potestas», cit., note 33, p. 19. 
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a problematic word. It is, as I said, the term «giusta» – 
legitimate – applied on grounds of necessity to both cas-
es. Again, an effort of interpretation is called for, which 
is all the more necessary here as the ambiguity bears on 
fundamental aspects of Beccaria’s thinking. 
With this in mind, let us now read the 1767 English 
translation:
But the punishment of death is not authorised by any right; 
for I have demonstrated that no such right exists. It is 
therefore a war of a whole nation against a citizen, whose 
destruction they consider as necessary, or useful to the gen-
eral good. But if I can further demonstrate, that it is nei-
ther necessary nor useful, I shall have gained the cause of 
humanity. The death of a citizen cannot be necessary, but 
in one case. When, though deprived of his liberty, he has 
such power and connections as may endanger the security 
of the nation; when his existence may produce a dangerous 
revolution in the established form of government. But, even 
in this case, it can only be necessary, when a nation is on 
the verge of recovering or losing its liberty; or in times of 
absolute anarchy, when the disorders themselves hold the 
place of laws. But in a reign of tranquility [...] there can be 
no necessity for taking away the life of a subject48.
A number of modifications attract our attention, 
some of them highly significant if viewed in light of 
present-day debate and of the interpretative options 
illustrated above. The sentence «But the punishment of 
death is not authorised by any right; for I have demon-
strated that no such right exists», for instance, is not an 
exact translation of: «Non è dunque la pena di morte un 
Diritto, mentre ho dimostrato che tale, essere non può», 
and sounds slightly more assertive, admitting of no 
exception that might intervene even in the future. This 
change, however, could be attributed simply to the una-
voidable differences entailed by all translations. On the 
contrary, the addition of «to the general good» already 
reveals a precise interpretative perspective, soon to be 
endorsed by other occurrences. The words: «even in this 
case, it can only be necessary» correspond only partly to 
«La morte di qualche Cittadino diviene dunque neces-
saria quando la nazione ricupera o perde». «Can only» 
restricts the field of application to a particular case only, 
whereas «diviene dunque necessaria» states a necessity 
but does not point to its limits.
Pride of place in an abolitionist perspective must 
be given, however, to the translation of the words «o nel 
tempo dell’anarchia», which become «or in times of abso-
lute anarchy». No reason of translation technique what-
soever required the insertion here of the word «absolute», 
evidently derived from a hermeneutic option. The sen-
48 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., pp. 103-104.
tence can now only be interpreted as denying all pos-
sibility of inflicting the death penalty within the social 
contract, not even under special circumstances. The 
translator seems to have tried to remove the ambiguity of 
the ‘first case’ by taking a stride in the abolitionist direc-
tion. «Absolute anarchy» definitely indicates a condition 
of total dissolution of the social contract, with a rever-
sion to the state of nature. It conveys, more directly, the 
idea that, both in a normal and in an exceptional state 
of things, under the social contract the death penalty is 
always illegitimate and should never be inflicted. 
Another change also strikes the reader. It is the 
translator’s omission of the clause «unless his death 
were the only real way to deter others from committing 
crimes. And this is the second reason for believing that 
the death penalty could be just and necessary49 («se non 
quando [...] necessaria la pena di morte»). Commenting 
above on the Italian original of this passage, we have 
not ignored the ambiguity introduced by the presence 
of the word «giusta». Eliminating the sentence with the 
explicit mention of a second case as well as the word 
«giusta» (legitimate), the ambiguity concerning a possi-
ble clash of paradigms disappears altogether. This does 
not mean that the content of the second case has been 
erased, since the confutation on historical and psycho-
logical grounds of the dissuasive capacity of the death 
penalty is amply provided for by the rest of the chapter. 
Again, the English translation significantly sweeps away 
all ambiguity, taking a precise stance in the same direc-
tion as the other modifications. The meaning becomes 
unequivocal: «in a reign of tranquility», when the social 
contract is functioning, under no circumstance whatso-
ever – not even when such contract is at risk of disso-
lution – can the death penalty be considered legitimate, 
necessary or useful. 
It is worth noting, incidentally, that if the second 
“motivo” has disappeared also in Morellet, the case of 
other modifications is different. Take, for example the 
corresponding French passage50: 
La peine de mort n’est donc autorisée par aucun droit. Elle 
ne peut être qu’une guerre de la nation contre un Citoyen 
dont on regarde la desctruction comme utile et nécessaire 
à la conservation de la Société. Si donc je démontre que, 
dans l’etat ordinaire de la Société, la mort d’un Citoyen 
n’est ni utile, ni nécessaire, j’aurais gagné la cause de 
l’Humanité. Je dis dans l’état ordinaire; car la mort d’un 
Citoyen peut être nécessaire en un cas; et c’est lorsque, pri-
vé de sa liberté, il a encore des relations et une puissance 
qui peuvent troubler la tranquillité de la nation; quand 
49 On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, cit., p. 52.
50 In chapter XXVIII of the Italian original and the English translation; 
in chapter XVI of the French translation, pp. 98-99.
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son existence peut produire une révolution dans la forme 
du gouvernement établi. Ce cas ne peut avoir lieu que 
lorsqu’une nation perd ou recouvre sa liberté, ou dans les 
temps d’Anarchie, [...] Mais pendant le règne tranquille de 
la Législation [...] il ne peut y avoir aucune nécessité d’ôter 
la vie à un Citoyen. 
The French and the English translations are simi-
lar, but not identical. Morellet also removes the sen-
tence which mentions a second case and contains the 
word “giusta”; and he also uses the expression «ce cas 
ne peut avoir lieu que» which is conceptually similar to 
«but, even in this case, it can only» and is different from 
«divien dunque necessaria quando». However, he does 
not add the word «absolute» to «anarchy», and exhibits 
other differences which reveal a conceptual distancing of 
the two translations.
We can thus conclude that the English translator did 
not only choose at times the French and at other times 
the Italian texts as his sources, but also inserted modifi-
cations of his own to be found in neither text. Therefore, 
he was not guided simply by a search for clarity but also 
by a philosophical vocation and a strategy, which were 
purely his own and which prompted him to dissolve the 
ambiguity of the original Beccarian text in a coherently 
radical abolitionist direction.
A BRIEF NOTE ON DETERRENCE IN BRITISH 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PENAL PRACTICE.
Deterrence was a sore point of eighteenth-century 
British criminal law and practice. As deterrence was 
a core principle in Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene, 
it was also the primary justification for the application 
of punishment in Britain. However, the two concep-
tions were miles apart. If Beccaria suggested deterrence 
through certainty of punishment, celerity, equality and 
penal parsimony, the British penal system mostly con-
ceived it as expressed by William Paley in The Principles 
of Moral and Political Philosophy. Along with Beccaria, 
Paley thought that the «proper end of human punish-
ment is, not the satisfaction of justice [Paley’s termi-
nology for revenge of the State], but the prevention of 
crimes»51. Differently from Beccaria, however, his con-
clusions were that, since punishment could not be cer-
tain, it must be exemplary. Thus, punishment should 
not be proportionate to the severity of the crime, but to 
the ease with which it was committed. This justified the 
application of the death penalty not only for murder, but 
51 W. Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Printed for 
R. Faulder, London 1785, p. 1.
also for minor offenses such as poaching, forgery, steal-
ing objects of little value from shops and houses, acts of 
theft difficult to prevent because these forms of property 
were so widely exposed to risk. Hence, the only way to 
protect property and deter crime was the threat of a ter-
rifying punishment.
Of course, these ideas were not shared by everybody 
in Britain, and debate had started before Beccaria, to 
continue for years also fuelled by his book52. However, 
it was only in 1808 that Samuel Romilly succeeded in 
securing the repeal of the statutes which imposed the 
death penalty for small thefts committed without vio-
lence. In 1820, bills to abolish capital punishment for 
wounding cattle and destroying trees were passed by the 
House of Commons but not by the House of Lords. And 
only in 1832 was the punishment of death abolished for 
stealing a horse or a sheep53.
In the light of this situation, the omission of the sen-
tence mentioning a second «motive» in chapter XXVIII, 
could also be explained as an attempt to remove a lin-
guistic ambiguity which might open up a space, albeit 
not intended by Beccaria, for a hypothetical future jus-
tification of the death penalty on grounds of deterrence. 
On this subject, the English translations exhibits 
another discrepancy with the Italian original. At the end 
of chapter XLVI, titled «Of Pardons», the translation has 
the following passage:
A small crime is sometimes pardoned, if the person offend-
ed chuses [sic] to forgive the offender. This may be an act of 
good nature and humanity, but it is contrary to the good 
of the public. For, although a private citizen may dispense 
with satisfaction for the injury he has received, he cannot 
remove the necessity of example. The right of punishing 
belongs not to any individual in particular, but to society 
in general, or the sovereign. He may renounce his own por-
tion of this right, but cannot give up that of others54. 
More coherently with its subject, in the Italian 
original this passage is located in chapter XXIX («Della 
cattura»/«Of Imprisonment»)55. By moving it to a more 
52 Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s influence on early discussions of punishment, 
1764-1789, cit., p. 183.
53 Maestro, Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform, Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia 1973, pp. 136-137. For a broad perspec-
tive, see L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its 
Administration from 1750, vol. I. The Movement for Reform (1750-1833), 
Stevens, London 1948.
54 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 177.
55 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., VI, p. 139 (cap. XXIX. «Del-
la cattura»): «Alcuni liberano dalla pena di un piccolo delitto quando la 
parte offesa lo perdoni, atto conforme alla beneficienza ed all’umanità, 
ma contrario al bene pubblico, quasi che un Cittadino privato potesse 
egualmente togliere colla sua remissione la necessità dell’esempio, come 
può condonare il rifacimento dell’offesa. Il diritto di far punire non è di 
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visible position, just before the conclusions (XLVII, 
«Conclusion»), the translator evidently wanted to call 
attention to it. 
This passage, in fact, refers to what was a com-
mon practice in Britain, and questions it on theoretical 
grounds. For reasons of convenience – since the offend-
ed party had to face all the expenses for capture and 
prosecution – and for reasons of empathy with the peo-
ple who, out of necessity, stole goods of little value and 
nonetheless risked death on the scaffold, the victims of 
thefts often did not prosecute the offenders56. This was 
one of the reasons that condemned the British penal 
system to great uncertainty. Certainty of punishment is 
what this translation highlights here in accordance with 
Beccaria’s tenet and in opposition to the English practice 
of random prosecution and discretionary sentencing. 
Certain but mild punishments, as recalled in the con-
cluding chapter, which the English translator transposes 
with great care and precision to the last sentence, evi-
denced in italics as in the Italian original: 
That a punishment may not be an act of violence, of one, 
or of many against a private member of society, it should 
be publish [public] immediate and necessary; the least 
possible in the case given; proportioned to the crime, and 
determined by the laws. 
CONCLUSIONS.
The results of the collation of the first English trans-
lation of Dei delitti e delle pene with the Italian original 
and the French version brings me to conclusions along 
two lines. One specifically relates to the actual text that 
introduced Beccaria in the English-speaking world. The 
other faces the more general question of what informa-
tion may be gleaned from the peculiar unfaithfulness of 
eighteenth-century translations. 
un solo, ma di tutti i Cittadini, o del Sovrano. E gli non può che rinun-
ziare alla sua porzione di diritto, ma non annullare quella degli altri». 
The French version has this passage in chapter XX. «Que la punition 
doit être certaine et inévitable. Les graces»: «Quequefois on s’asbtient de 
punir un léger délit, lorsque l’offensé le pardonne; acte de bienfaisance, 
mais contraïre au bien public. Un particulier peut bien ne pas exiger la 
reparation du dommage qu’on lui a fait, mais le pardon qu’il accorde ne 
peut détruire la nécessité de l’example. Le droit de punir n’appartient à 
aucun Citoyen en particulier, mais à tous et au Souverain. L’offensé peut 
renoncer à sa portion de ce droit, mais non pas ôter aux autres la leur» (p. 
132). It should be remembered that the chapter «Delle grazie» appeared 
in the fifth edition for the first time, and for this reason it was not in 
Morellet’s version, which was based on the third edition, albeit with some 
additions sent by the author to the translator before the fifth edition was 
in print. See page 000 here above (PER REDAZIONE: p. 000). 
56 J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England. 1660-1800, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1986, pp. 35-73 (ch. II. «Prosecution»).
As to the text, the collation enabled me to define 
once and for all the question of the sources for the 1767 
English translation. There were no doubt two sour-
ces. One source was an Italian 1766 edition (either the 
sixth edition harlem, et se vend a paris, Chez Molini 
Libraire, Quai des Augustins; or, the sixth edition har-
lem, 1766), and the other was the French version. The 
collation also revealed that the English translation con-
tains relevant, albeit not especially frequent, differences 
in form and content, which appear in neither source. In 
these cases, the original Italian text was consistently and 
coherently modified. Examining an excerpt from chapter 
II («Of the Right to punish»), I found that the transla-
tion eliminated an ambiguity which ran the risk of being 
interpreted as acknowledging a connection between law 
and force, and of placing the origin of law in the utility 
of the ‘greatest number’ (which, differently from «com-
mon utility», might counteract penal parsimony, con-
senting penal excess). I also examined passages from 
chapter XXVIII («Of the Punishment of Death»), realiz-
ing that the changes introduced aimed at rendering the 
text unequivocally and thoroughly abolitionist. Inter-
estingly and unexpectedly, these modifications involve 
questions focused also by present-day debate over the 
interpretation of these passages of the Italian text. 
Translations are first of all interpretations. One can 
therefore deduce that such relevant changes represent, as 
it were, a kind of taking sides in the eighteenth-century 
Beccarian controversy, and that they can thus provide 
clues for the understanding of the project this transla-
tion was involved in and the task it intended to fulfil. It 
is worth noting that this translation certainly had a wide 
audience from the start, considering the fact that many 
editions were published in Britain and in the overseas 
colonies in the first few years after its initial appearance. 
Moreover, its first publisher John Almon was politically 
involved and would soon publish books and a periodical 
for the American revolutionaries.
Much remains to be investigated, but I am convinced 
that the information provided here may well offer a use-
ful lead for further discoveries. A knowledge of how the 
text which disseminated Beccaria’s ideas in the English-
speaking world was actually framed may help to clarify 
aspects of its reception, with the reasons for its rejections 
and acceptances. Which text, for instance, triggered the 
Pennsylvania experiment? Was it Beccaria’s original, the 
French translation or the English translation? As we have 
seen, they are different in crucial points, and the question 
therefore is anything but pointless. 
So much for the conclusions focusing directly on 
Beccaria’s text. The second line of considerations per-
tains to a more general perspective. As is well known, 
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an important dimension of eighteenth-century cos-
mopolitanism fed on translations. In many cases, the 
French language functioned as a «clearing-house» for 
books written in other languages, which were translated 
first into French and subsequently into other European 
languages. This was probably the most common proce-
dure. But, as we have seen in the case of On Crimes and 
Punishments, not the only one; other procedures were 
followed as well. Were there many such hybrid cases? 
Since, in the eighteenth century, translations were a 
highly effective channel for the dissemination of texts, 
promoting the circulation of ideas and of the new lan-
guages of politics, law, philosophy, economy, science and 
medicine; and since they were notoriously unfaithful to 
the original and more target-oriented that in later times, 
one should expect interesting information to be gleaned 
through close examinations of translations. What has 
surfaced in our enquiry could be taken as an example. I 
am firmly of the view that highly relevant but otherwise 
elusive details remain to be brought to light by probing 
the folds of the changes which eighteenth-century trans-
lations made to texts.  
As a corollary to the intentio auctoris, the inten-
tions which underpinned the work of eighteenth-century 
translators are a crucial fact which cannot be ignored if 
we are to achieve a proper understanding of the eight-
eenth-century transmission of texts into foreign cultural 
environments. 
